If you want to understand nature, you must be conversant with the language in which nature speaks to us.
Research on people's uilderstanding of global warnling sends a clear and coinpelling message. People, even those deemed well educated, do not hold effective lneiltal models of global cliinate change upon which to base decisioils about their actions (e.g., Bostroin et a /., 1994; Sternlan and Boot11 Sweeney, 2002 ; see also Bostroin and Lashof, Chapter 1, his volume). This research continues to find that people tcnd to coilfuse global warming \\.it11 ozone depletion, do not understand the causes of global warmingrarely inentioning energy use and autonlobile ei:lissions as causes and naming pollution in general as the inost coinmoilly cited cause -and do not realize that even if we act now, we mill continue to see an incrcase in global warming. For example, Sterman and Booth S~veeney (2002) found misconceptions amongst M I T Sloan School of Managenlent students, sucli as the belief that it would be sufficieilt to stabilize einissions at current rates,
and that we call wait to see what happens and then act. They write that while it is not surprising that school children do not understand the processes governing cliinate change, it is illore disturbing that highly educated adults do not. Disturbing, yes; surprising, well, maybe not . . . .
In this chapter, we suggest that given the coinplexity of the concepts and lack of opportunity to learn them, there's no particular reasoil that 11011-scientists ~o u l d ~ulderstand or be able to act upon cli~nate change issues, and that the problem needs to be refranled in terms of how we call help people of all ages learn what they need to know. The current adult population grew up in a time whcn the curriculun~ did not offer the understandings necessary to enable people to understand the language or patterns of nature in general, or climate change issues in particular. Educational standards are just beginning to reflect the growing awareness of the importance of global warining as a topic of science education, and current curriculuill standards in many states have just begun to address cliinate change directly. This raises a number of questions: "What can we d o 1101~ to educate the present adult population about climate change?" and "How can we help tonlorrow's adults better understand environnlental issues?'' What is i~lvolved in learning the language or patterns of nature and achieviilg a deep understanding of global climate change? And even if people hold deep understanding, what else d o they need in order to choose actions that support decreases in greenhouse gas emissions and increase the ability to respond to climate change?
Two lessons on educating for intelligent action from education research
There is deep interest in the questign of what people need to learn to ~ui~der-stand the biosphere, and inany ideas fro111 diverse and eloquent perspectives on what educational components need to be included (e.g., Thomashow, 2002) . While it is an important first step, as others have argued (e.g., Bostrom et ~l . , 1994) , to assess what the public's knowledge looks like in contrast to scientific determinations of what they need to know, the educational problenl for achieving understanding extends far beyond that. We need to cofisider the terrain between lay and expert mental models and figure out what it takes to help learners traverse that terrain. This involves understanding the patterns in how people perceive and think about environmental issues -cognitive and percept i~a l assumptions or default patterns that are likely to impede understanding and the ability to act. Further, if we set educated action as opposed to inert knowledge as the bar for success, then the educational challenges are extensive. We need to help the public develop the ability to understand climate change but also the sensitivity to perceive opportunit~es that invite action and, subsequently. the inclination to act.
This chapter introduces two lessons, r e l e~a n t to global warming and to public education efforts as well as learning in schools, which can be drawn from a broader survey of the literatures in science education, cogniti~,e development, and learning theory. As we elaborate below, this is just a start. The educational challenges surrounding climate changc are many, and tile pal ticular cognitive issues in understanding global vvarming invite some of the most difficult problellls in education to rsnr their ugly begs. This suggests fair amount of humility aboat the endeavor, but also the importance ofnzinins contributio~ls from diverse disciplines. F~nally, we consider that the path to making educational decisions based q o n what we want people to perceive. know, and d o is anything but straightforward. IHowever, we also suggest areas where we believe our collal,orati\e energies are well spent seelti!~g ansners So wl1;1t are some lessons from the educational research for teaching the comple,, issaes involvecl in global ivarming? Guesne, and Tibergl~ien, 1985; Bell, 1999: Moslowski, 1976; Mendelson and Shultz, 1976; Siegler and Liebert, 1974) . In general, people are not good at cxteilded searches io assign cuuse or agency to factors that fall far away from an effect in space or time. The ~011~111011 tendency is towards efficiency. By contrast, the causes and effects of global warming are often separated in space and time (see also Dilling a~i d blfoser, Introduction, this volume). An inci-case ill greenhouse gases in one part of the jvorld leads to changes in climate that coine decades afler, and often thousands of miles away from, these initial emissions.
People also tend to o~rerlook causes that are non-obvious in favor of those that are obvious (e.g., Brinkn~an and Boschhuizcn, 1989; Leach ef crl., 1992) . Greenhouse gases are not visible or physicnlly tangible, making it easier to disiniss tllenl wllen analyzing the primary causes of climate change. Even in the case of easily observable outcomes. as in the sunset exainple in the introduction, non-obvious causes are typically overlooked. While not rclated to greenhouse gases, brilliant sunsets result from another non-obvious cause -particulate matter associated with smog that alters the refractive angle of sunlight. Particulate matter is not easily visible with the naked eye and so it i$ not usually accounted for as a cause of brilliant sunsets. Greenhouse gases pose an even greater chal!enge because the causes ar~rl the outcomes (at litast at this stage) are difficult to detect without lon,o-term attention lo patterns and c a r c f~~l mcasureinents. The combinntion of spatial gaps, temporal delays, and non-ob~rious causes inakes it all too easy to ignore the causes of global ~varming.
The temporal aspects of global warining are difficult for other reasons as well. In order to realize that global warlniilg is occurring, we need to be able to track patterns over time. People are not necessarily good at reasoning about patterns over time, and too often extrapolate from the moment (Dorner, 1989) . They typically d o uilderst:lnd systems that i n v o l~~e simple accumulation, for instance, increasing trash in landfills, or -inore visible to [he general population -along highways. However, once conlplications are introduced such as exponential growth or variations in rate of change, people find it harder to track the patterns. Positive feedback loops, where one event triegers other events tliat increase the cause of the initial event: introduce further conlplexity into rates of change. For ex;~mples, global warilliilg causes a decl-ease in the polar ice cover, which reflects solar radiation. When the ice melts, the dark-colored land or water that lies beneath it absorbs inore solar radiation, serving to exacerbate the initial problein by illcreasing local surface heating. Understanding these feedback patterns requires an understanding of patterns that fall outside of the typical accumulation models.
Beyond this, natural systems often have the ability to "absorb" a certain amount of change until enough change has accumulated so that it becomes noticeable, or smaller effects interact so that at a given threshold, the system's equilibrium "tips" and profound changes occur. For instance, while climate change is commonly viewed as a slow and steady process, it is now generally accepted that a sufficient disruption of the balance of temperature and salinity in the ocean as a result of melting polar ice could trigger massive climate shifts over a very short period of time (National Research Council, 2002) . Patterns that have no obvious effects early on are easily ignored until it is too late. These have been referred to as "creeping environ~nental phenomena" (Glantz ct al., 1999) . I11 the social realm, systems that change in non-linear ways are soinetimes said to cross a "tipping point" -a concept that is beginning to find its way into public discourse (Gladwell, 2000) .
However, inost people still analyze evidence using a simpler accumulation model, so when there are no visible effects. it is all too easy to think nothing is happening.
People tend to give linear or narrative causi~l explanations that are story-like in the form of "first this happened, then it mxde that happen," anil so on. These have a domino-like quality to them (Grotzer, 1993 (Grotzer, , 2004 . Global \varmin~ does not fit well with linear, narrative causal forms. It is the result of multiple intertwined causes, and results in nlultiple effects at man> different levels. Instead of serving only one role in the causal story -as the effect at the end of the chain of causes -effects act as f~frther causes.
When thinking about the origin of an observed phenomenon, nlost people envision a centralized cause. often wit11 a single agent (like a sergeant in charge of a platoon) or with a coordinated set of agents (llke a town decision-making board). People have a 11al.der time envisioning nlultiple cauyes that are d~spersed. The causes of global warming, however. are exactl~ that: spread out or decentralized. 'The effect emerges due to the collecti~e actions of lnany people -it is an emergent causality. The behavior follocved by Inany indiviciual actors gives rise to what can be dramatic effect> (e.g., Resnick, 1994) . This runs cocnter to the default assunlptions of most people which tend towards what Kesnick (1996) has called the "centralized mindset." It assumes an orchestrated leader or some pre-existing, built-ill "inhomogeneity" in the environ~nent is responsible for con~plex patterns. Worhing with a computer prograin called StarLogo, Wilensky and Kesnick (1999) found that students are typically shockcd to see how individual rules of interaction at one level lead to ernergenr effects at another level, and that they find it very difficult to predtct macro-level properties that enlergc 111 systems as a result of micro-level interactions (e.g., .
Notice Illat centralized causes also typically have a centralized and easily identifiuble intent. 111 emergent causalily. the effect emerges due to the collectivc actions of inally agents whose actions have no coordinated illtent. Agcncy is distributed and non-i~ltentional (in terms of the specific outcome). Because agency and intent at one level are not easily connected to outcolnzs at the emergent le~fel, it is difficult for people to sec thcJr individual role in the process -resulting in diffusion of I-esponsibility. One person's effort, f'or instance, to reduce their 0~~1 1 greenhouse gas emissions by driving less or turning off the lights at home does not directly result in an ohservable impact, and it is difiicult to encourage be11;ivior that seci~ls futile at the individual level witllout a sense of the collective, emergent effects (see tlie discussion on urgency in Moser, Chapter 3, this ~~o l u m e ) .
In emergent causality, there can be intention at the level of the individual actors, yet the broader effect does not necessarily stem from n broadly defined social intention. Uilderstanding the role of illtention in systems with trigger effects \vhere the magnitude of the resulting effect may have little to do wit11 any one particular agent, or in self-organizing systems where there is 110 clear internal or external asent. is also conceptually challenging. The relatively lowcr salience of 11l5lly fine-grained actions coillpared to illore dramatic individualized ones is a barrier to recognizing distribuled agency. St is wry diffic~~lt, f'rom a cognitive stance. to juggle the actions of illany indi~~idual parts and illlagi~le or predict outcomes.
What does it mean to altead to these default patterns \~~llcn educating ~tbout global warnling? How nlight we use tile ilif~7r11l;iti011 011 people's reductive biases in our attenlpts to educate students or the current adult population? Beconling aware of people's reductive biases should enable us to iind better ways to get our rnessages across. For instance, \lie could use computer technology to display si~llulations of global environmental problems or to explain causal connections between our actions 11nd clinlate change and so on in public places such as malls or libraries. These could serve to make non-obvious effects inore obvious. In the design of programs in the popular media, we call seek ways to reveal ho\v the causal pattei-11s can "sneak up 011 us" and. through simulated time lapse or dyna~nic imagery, help the public perceive and attend to thesc hard-to-perceive patterns. Ure call also make listeners aware of their default tendencies (e.g., through short, fun gallles on touch conlputer screens) and how these tendencies can eventually lead to lu~~anticipated and potentially hurtful consequences.
As we educate for the future, we need to make today's students aware of the structures of coillplexity so that they are less likely to reduce complex patterns to simplistic ones. This is a problein that education researchers are working to tackle. For instance, researchers have developed a curriculum designed to restructure the ways that students think about causality withill given science concepts (e.g., Grotzer, 2003 , electronic building blocks that simulate causal and systems concepts to allow students to discover the complex behaviors related to particular structures (Zuckerman. 2003) . and computer programs, such as StarLogo (Resnick, 1994) that allow students to experiment with how rule-based interactions of individuals give rise to coinplex system-level effects. This work has demonstrated significant improvements in students' ability to reason about conlplex causalities and systems behaviors (e.g., Grotzer. 2003; Sudbury, 2000. Resnick, 2003; Wilensky, 1998; Zuckerinan, 2003 Environmental education has long sought to engender environnlental awareness and appreciation as well as the inclination to care for the environment. In illany respects, this recognition surpasses what happens in other areas of education. Enviroi~mental educators (e.g., Thomashow, 1995) have designed thoughtful curricula for making people aware of their connectioii to and dependence on the Earth, and to help students develop an ecological identity and sense of ecological ciiizenship. These efforts are of the utillost importance.
a,
The educational literature underscores another type of seilsitivity and inclination that requires attention. If we want intelligent enviroilinental action, we need to help the public learn how to act 011 climate change, to perceive opporti~nities that invite action, and subsequently, to be inclined to act -at a particular moment. Behavioral psjichology suggests this can be aided by giving people very specific instructioils on the action, frequent peer support, and recurring positive reinfcrcement (Clark, Kotchen, and Moore, 2003; DeYoung, 1996 ; F r a h~n ct (il., Kollinuss and Agyen~an, 2002; McKenzie-Mohr, 2000 ; see also Tribbia? Chapter 16, this volume). Perlcins, Jay, and Tishlnan (1993) define three dimensions of the disposition towards intelligent perfonnance: sensitivity, ability, and inclination. Sensitivity involves the ability to recognize occasions to apply a particular skill, unders~anc"lng, or piece of knowledge. Ability refers to having that slti!l, knowledge. or understandillg in one's repertoire. Inclination refers to being motivated to apply the particular skill, knowledge. or uliclerstanding in the given instance.
In terins of global wanning, one can know quite a lot about the issue and c;111 even care about it, but if on a moment-to-moment and day-to-day basis, one canilot recogilize opportiinities to Llse that kno~vledge, then it doesn't do a whole lot of good. While that sou~lds obvious, education efforts often focus on ability -leaving out sensiti\~ity, and soilletin~es inclination, too. Perkius c . r nl. (2000) found that of the three dimensions, seilsitivity appeared to be the largest stuillbling block for students. E:,\ren wl~en students had the ability to understand partic~llar patterns, they didn't identify instances of them. In part, this may be related to the reductive biases discussed above. One's default assunlptions hinder one's ability to recognize alterilative patterns. We've probably ail had an experience where we realized in hindsight how we might have done soinetlling in a better way. The challenge is how to help people become miildful of everyday opportimities to change their beliaviors in real time. The experience of 20120 hindsight is only helpful if it changes what we d o next time.
Moving from ha\.ing thc' ability to engaging in new action patterns is a ~lotoriously prickly problein in education that is subject to all sorts of situational variables, Ho\ve\,cr, there are seine straightforward ways to increase the likelihood that people will recognize actioil opportuuities. What does it mean. then, fi-om a public education stance, to attend to sensitivity, to growiilg the awareness for "actionable" opportunitics'??Here are soille examples. Articles on global warillill could include a list of typical everyday actions and tllen list an alternative set of "choices for the environment" so that when people are engaged in the actions, the illoillent becoilles a triggel: for coilsidzriilg an alternative choice. Similar to campaigns that encourage parents to read to their children or know where their children are, ads could ask, "It's 10 p.m. Have you plailned out your day toinorrow to minimize the driving you have to do? D o it for the environment -for yourself and your family." Public service ailnounceineilts could focus on liey decision points: for instance, the choice of a new car and the big environ~nental consequeilces that choice has over tiine.
While sensitivity, ability, and iilclination are critical preconditions for action, they call also interact in ways that exacerbate the problein of inaction. For instance, the perceptual and cogilitive challeilges outlined above relate inost dil-ectly to the ability to perceive particular kinds of patterns. However, they also affect people's awareness of the problenls of global warming and, subsequently, their inclination. So in assessing risk, people attend to and are more easily stirred to action over a risk when its cause is persoilified or involves intentional agency, is centralized rather than decentralized, is immediate rather than cumulative, and is obvious rather than non-obvious. This can be so despite the magnitude of the effects. Global warming, despite the potential for massive catastrophic effects, sits on the wrong side of each of these tensions. Public education campaigns could make people aware of their tendency to focus on one side of these tensions to the exclusion of others. Imagine a magazine ad that poses the question, "What would you do if a terrorist were working silently to disrupt our weather systems, make our world inhabitable, and destroy life as we know it? Would you act? Would you want your government to act? Well, it is happening, and that terrorist is called Global Warming. It has recruited you as one of its agents -every time you get into your car." The ad could then explain the connection. Making the analogy forces the association in people's minds and makes it more difficult to ignore the non-obvious, c~unulative causes of potentially massive catastrophic effects.
One could argue that such approaches play on people's fears. This is certainly true and, ideally, one would want to develop inclination in the most positive ways -that our actions as global citizens matter -as part of developing an environmental appreciation and an ecological identity. This should certainly be a part of the long-term educational process that schools and other communicators engage in, in addition to helping students understand that certain types of causes command their attention more readily than others. However, in terms of public education, there are so many messages competing for people's attention and for limited resources that such comparisons may be needed to help people realize the urgency of a non-obvious, potentially catastrophic problen~. (For caveats and concomitant messages and framings, see the chapters by Moser; and Dunwoody, Chapters 3 and 5, this volume.)
In the introduction to this chapter, we argued that if we set educated action as the bar for success, then the educational challenges are extensive. We then elaborated two aspects of the "what should be taught" piece of that challenge: (1) the need to map the terrain between lay and expert mental models in terins of cognitive and perceptual patterns and figure out what it takes to help learners traverse that terrain, and (2) the need to help students and the public develop sensitivity, ability, and the inclination to understand and act on climate change. However, this is really just the tip of the iceberg. For instance, in order to deal well with the challenges of a changing world, people will need to be able to tackle fuzzy, ill-structured problems. They will need to be able to think flexibly and to develop creative solutions to multifaceted, novel issues. They will need to learn the skills of inquiry to find answers to new questions and to apply their understandings to authentic problenls at the i~ltersectioil of science, social and/or public policy, health, comi~~ui~ication, and so on (see Bateson, C h a p~e r is, this volume). When one tries to take on the whole scope of related educational challenges, the inagilitude of the problenl can be overwhelming -only underscoring the urgency of the call to action.
Achieving "intelligent e~mvircnme~atal action": pedagogical cllallenges
As we set about deciding 111haf to teach, we also need to pay close attention to /loll: to educate studeilts and the public to understand \$arious causal and perceptual patterns, and how to delrelnp sensitivity, ability, ;und inclination. Certain pedagogical challenges become central to the endeavor. For example, in thinking about global warining, there is a critical connection between , action at the level of the individual and collective action, and it is natural to think about the problein through this lens. This volun~e takes that approacl~. At the saine time, as discussed above, the ability to make this critical connection is a highly challenging cognitive task. People have great difficulty reasoilillg at different levels. At different levels, the definition of what ? const~tutes an "object" ;:nd the inherent forins of ca~sd!ity ;~cting upon that "object" vary. For instance, 111 a traffic jam, at oile k i e l the cars are the objects and a focus on their actions leads to an analysis of what to do about tlie janl. At another level, the jam becomes the object of focus. and rather than analyzing the actions of individual cars, one analyzes the patterns relevant to the jam itself (Wilensky and Resnick, 1999) . Similar difficulties have been seen in reasoniilg about ecosystems where students often extend the outcoines of the interactioils between individual organisins to the population level -thus inissing population-level effects such as balance and flux (e.g., Driver cr cii., 1994; Grotzer, 2002; Grotzer and Basca, 7003; Wilensky and Resnick, 1999) . Our collective efforts \vould be well spent identifj~ing and addressing central pedagogical challenges such as these.
Anotl~er reason that it is iinporta~lt to give careful thought to "how" is that the inaterial we need to teach does not auto~llatically inlply a certain way of teaching it. For example, a c o i n n~o i~ approach that scientists take to teaching scientific concepts to the general population is t o figure out what mental ~nodels they theinselves hold as scientists, and then try to teach those models to the public. However, this strategy ignores the fact that scientists hold a wealth of assumptions that provide the context for those models. For instance, while inembers of the public inight argue that you can't prove with certainty that certain outcoines will occur, scientists assume that the enterprise of science rests on the best available evidence. They recognize that the explanatory models that we use today are the best interpretation that we have based on the current evidence. We are not arguing that the population isn't capable of grasping the concepts, or that they are "scientifically illiterate" and that it would take too long to educate thein. We are saying that the lay population does not hold the same set of assumptions as scientists do, and that translating messages for the pub!ic involves analyzing, from the public's perspective, how those messages will be heard and understood, and then helping them to transition to more scientifically accurate or complete understandings. Then decisions can be inade about what contexts should be offered before energy is spent on miscotnm~~nication (see Dunwoody, Chapter 5 , this volun~e). Often there are intermediate causal models ) that hold sufficient explanatory power to enable intelligent action on behalf of novices and that are more easily grasped than a full-blown expert inodel would be. For instance, in teaching about density to young children, educators often use particle models or "dots-per-box" rnodels instead of ~nodels that explain atomic inass or bonds and how thcy account for spacing. The sin~plzr model filnctions as a u s e f~~l bridge for those students who do pursue deeper understanding and go o n to learn the atomic explanation. Neither educators nor scientisls can dzsign these models alone. They need to be the result of a collaborative effort bctween educators and scientists. We strongly encourage the scientific and education conlmunities to collaborate on definin_g what those nligllt look like.
As neiv problems arise in education, there is often a gall for extensive research. In deciding what we need to know from a pedugogical sta~ldpoint. ii. is inlportant to caref~~lly mine what we already know from related contexts. One of the best ways that we can move forward is to use the information at our disposal. Thornashow (2001: 193) writes that "ive know very little about the cognitive origins of ecological learning and biospheric perception." However, spread across the different literatures in cognitive development. learnin2 theory, science education, environmeiltal psychology, and sociology, there is vast information on how children understand concepts relevant to ecologq at different ages (Grotzer, 2003) . We have to be willing to look across the typical bouildaries of our fields. 0 1 1 balance and in support of Tl~omasl~ocv's assertioil, we certainly need to expand upon xvhat we know, and this ii~cludes greater awareness of tlie tacit knowledge and epistemological assuinptions scientists hold and how they are learned. Of course there are caveats to borrowing research fi~ldirigs across discipli~~ary boundaries. It is important to keep in mind the contexts in which infonnatiol~ was collected. For instance, developmental research is often carried out so that "liz1ellige17 [ errvi~o~lllzerrtal actiolz" ill global it3arr,lillg 277 task denlailds are carefully controlled for; however, the subjects are seldom, if ever, given optinla1 educational guidailce for learning a set of concepts. Therefore, the research contexts tell us what subjects d o with carcfully controlled task demands, but not what is possillle with optimal educational guidance (Metz, , 1997 . Our efforts \will be most productive if they build upon the existing research base across disciplines with its limits in nliild and an eye towards new possibilities. \Ve believe that Me don't yet know what is possible for helping the public understand global war~ning with optillla1 educational support o r wit11 purposeful collaboration between educators, scientists, and the inany others working on the urgent problem of c l i m~~t e change. But this chapter offers seine insights into a few ltey building blocks: understanding people's default cognitive patterns, recognizing their difficulties understanding complex systems, and deve!oping their sensitivities, abilities, and incli~~ations to act in eilvironn~e~ltally intelligent ways. i t js imperative that we help the pub!ic beconle environmentnlly intelligent and learn to act with that intelligence, rather than just admonish people for not doing so. Dedicating ourselves to that effort inspires optiinism that future generations will become "conversant with the language in wl~ich nature speaks t o us," and that we will be able t o adinire sunsets nit11 our children.
Notes
1. While Richard Feynman was referring specifically to mathematics. the question can be asked as to what other patterns one must grasp in order to understand the language of natni-e. He made t!ie statement in various foi.ms, both written and in interviews. A published source can be found at Feynman (1967) . 2. We realize that public school education intcndcd to inducc behavioral changes involves significant, but not unprecedented, policy considerations (e.g., education about recycling also led to new bellaviors anlong students and eventually their families). To adequately treat the arguments made in the contentious debate about control over cducatioilal content would require a far Illore substantial treatment than space here allows.
